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The Role of Management Incentives in the Choice of Stock Repurchase Methods 
Ata Torabi 
This study employs conditional event study methodology to analyze how managers’ personal 
motives affect the method by which firms repurchase their shares. To address this question, we 
examine insider trading activities around the announcement date of a stock repurchase. We find 
that firms are more likely to choose tender offers rather than an open market repurchases when 
the respective announcements are followed by heightened net insider sales. The results are most 
significant in the two months subsequent to the announcement. Our findings remain robust when 
examining the relationship between net insiders sales and stock repurchase methods in a sample 
that includes matched firms. We do not find any significant correlation between pre-
announcement insider trading and the type of repurchase method a firm employs. Similarly, there 
are no differences between the long-term accounting or stock price returns of our sample firms 
when comparing the two repurchase methods. Our findings support Fried (2000) who proposes 
that tender offer repurchases are used by insiders to directly or indirectly transfer value among 
shareholders with insiders emerging ahead of the average public shareholder. As such, they 
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1. Introduction and Hypotheses Development 
Stock repurchases and agency theory are two widely researched topics in the finance 
literature with both subjects having a direct impact on corporate decisions. In regards to research 
on stock repurchases, a small portion focuses on the different methods of performing stock 
repurchases and a few of those have examined these two topics simultaneously.  
Agency costs that arise from the differing interests of firm executives and shareholders 
have been an important subject in the corporate governance literature. One important branch of 
the literature examines the impact of top-management compensation on agency costs. The 
relation between the interests of shareholders and executives has been assessed the subject of 
academic research for many decades. In one of the earlier studies, Jenson and Murphy (1990) 
estimate that over the period 1977 to 1986, CEO wealth changes by approximately $3 for every 
$1000 change in shareholder wealth. To increase the correlation between these figures and thus 
better align the interests of executives and shareholders, stock options have become a popular 
and important part of executive compensation packages. Over the last two decades, there has 
been a large increase in equity-based compensation with Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) reporting 
an increase of over 600% in equity-based compensation for the top five executives from 1993 to 
2000. However, studies such as Yermack (1995) have found no clear link between agency costs 
and equity-based compensation. 
Similarly to agency theory, the empirical research regarding stock repurchases is vast. 
However, to date, few studies have examined the differences between different types of 
repurchase methods. Moreover, they typically focus on the signaling effect of a given repurchase 
method. Researchers frequently argue that signaling theory explains a firm's decision to conduct 
a tender offer repurchase rather than an open market repurchase because open market 
repurchases tend to be cheaper. The argument states that a signal must be costly in order to be 
credible. The substantial costs associated with tender offers allow firms to send a strong signal of 
underpricing to the market. It is important to note that this signal indicates that the firm's shares 
are perceived as being underpriced by the firm's executives without the necessary presence of 
actual underpricing. Comment and Jarrell's (1991) results show that following a repurchase 
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announcement, the market reacts more positively to tender offers than to open market 
repurchases. This effect is consistent with the signaling hypothesis. 
There are two sets of empirical research that have examined equity-based executive 
compensation and stock repurchase programs simultaneously. First, some studies relate dividend 
policy, often considered  a substitute to a stock repurchase, to executive compensation. They 
have consistently shown a strong negative relation between dividends and the number of stock 
options held by managers, and a positive relation between repurchases and managerial stock 
options (See, e.g., Jolls, 1998, and Fenn and Liang, 2001). These studies differentiate between 
different methods of distributing cash to shareholders, but do so only by comparing dividends to 
share buybacks.  
A second set of studies has examined the relation between stock repurchase programs and 
insider trading prior to the respective repurchase announcements. In an attempt to understand the 
role of mispricing in motivating buybacks, Chan et al. (2012) find significant insider-trading 
behavior prior to the announcement, particularly when the firm's stock appears to be underpriced. 
Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch (1992) find increased insider buying and reduced insider selling 
activity prior to fixed price repurchases. Our paper provides new insights into the managerial 
decision-making process regarding different repurchase methods by investigating insider-trading 
behavior prior and following the announcement. 
In order to understand a firm’s decision between these two main repurchase methods, it is 
important to understand a firm's motives for repurchasing its shares. There are several reasons 
for stock repurchases, each supported by a large amount of empirical evidence. Jensen (1986) 
provides evidence for stock repurchases as a method to distribute excess capital to shareholders. 
Dann (1981) shows that management initiates stock repurchase programs when they perceive 
that the firm’s stock is undervalued in the financial market. Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) find 
a greater likelihood of stock repurchases when leverage ratios are below their optimal value. 
Bagwell (1991) argues and provides supporting evidence that a repurchase can be used as a 
takeover deterrence technique. He theorizes that shareholders who are willing to accept the 
repurchase offer are the ones with the lowest valuation for the firm, therefore, the repurchase will 
skew the distribution of the shareholders towards a more expensive pool. Finally, Jolls (1998) 
3 
 
provides supporting evidence for a relationship between management incentives and stock 
repurchase programs. Most of these studies have examined the reasons for repurchasing 
separately but the results are consistent in the few articles that have examined the motives 
concurrently. Dittmar (2000) examines these motives simultaneously and finds evidence in 
support of all motives during the period from 1977 to 1996. Among the different motives for 
stock repurchases, takeover deterrence and management incentives are the only two that benefit 
from the quick price adjustments in the stock market offered by tender offer repurchases. With a 
large proportion of tender offer repurchases not being initiated due to takeover deterrence, Fried 
(2000) proposes that tender offer repurchases are used by insiders to directly or indirectly 
transfer value among shareholders with insiders emerging ahead of the average public 
shareholder. In addition, he offers explanations as to why signaling theory is not a probable 
reason behind the choice of management to initiate tender offers in lieu of open market 
repurchases. He argues that in the majority of tender offer programs, insiders decline to 
announce their intentions. In other words, insiders are reluctant to commit to a non-tender. 
However, if insiders who initiated the stock repurchase believe that the stock is undervalued, 
then they should keep their stocks and not tender. Additionally, he argues that the large abnormal 
stock returns one can typically observe following a tender offer announcement are at least 
partially due to price pressure effects.  It is also important to note that, assuming market 
efficiency, there is no reason for the firm to conduct non-defensive tender offer repurchases. 
Other evidence not in line with the signaling theory has been found in the long-term 
performance of firms following a stock repurchase.  Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 
(1995) find a significant 12.14 percent four year average abnormal returns for firms following an 
open-market share repurchase. In addition, the signaling theory argues that tender offers send a 
stronger signal of the positive expectations of management. Therefore, we should expect larger 
changes in earnings following a tender offer repurchase announcement than an open market 
repurchase announcement. Inconsistent with the signaling theory, Lie and McConnell (1998) 
find no significant difference in earnings after the announcement of different repurchase 
programs although other researchers document an increase in earnings following fixed price 
repurchase programs. The results in regards to future earnings and future stock valuation suggest 
that the increase in prices following a tender offer repurchase announcement compared to the 
4 
 
price changes following open market repurchase announcements are not due to investors' new 
expectations regarding the firm's future earnings and growth.  
In this paper, we extend Comment and Jarrell's (1991) and Vermaelen's (1981) work by 
comparing stock repurchase methods in two ways. First, we do not make the same assumption as 
Vermaelen (1981) and subsequent authors who argue that managers do not tender their own 
shares. Descriptive statistics presented by Fried (2000) indicate that this basic assumption is not 
always accurate for tender offers. Therefore, it becomes necessary to look at management 
incentives when analyzing the differences between stock repurchase methods. Second, we 
examine the long-term performance of the firm following a stock repurchase announcement 
while the previous literature has typically focused on short-term stock performance. Considering 
that the information asymmetry between insiders and public shareholders allows insiders to more 
accurately predict the future performance of the firm, long-term stock performance should be a 
better proxy for stock price undervaluation. The objective of this study is to examine whether 
signaling theory or the hypothesis put forward by Fried (2000) in regards to management 
incentives better describes the decision of management to choose tender offer repurchases over 
open-market repurchases. These findings are of great importance to investors as well as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and other market regulators as they may reveal a need for 
new regulations regarding repurchase programs and executive trading.   
2. Sample and Data Description 
We employ several different databases for our study including the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) Platinum database and the Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF) provided by 
Thomson Financial. These two databases provide a list of all U.S. stock repurchases and 
information regarding transactions in derivative and non-derivative securities by executives and 
other corporate insiders. Stock repurchase announcement dates and other attributes of the 
repurchase programs are obtained from the SDC. Table 1 provides a descriptive summary of 
U.S. stock repurchases from January 1, 1995, to December 31, 2007. We choose this end date to 
allow for the calculation of the long-term stock performance of  our sample firms and to avoid 
any undue biases that may affect our results from the 2008 financial crisis. 
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Insider holdings and trading activities are captured through Forms 3, 4, and 5 which 
corporate insiders file with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Corporate 
insiders are defined as a company’s officers and directors and any beneficial owners of more 
than ten percent of a class of the company’s equity securities. Initial filings are performed using 
Form 3 and any changes in ownership are reported on Form 4. Finally, Form 5 is used to report 
any transactions that should have been reported earlier on Form 4. We obtain this data from the 
IFDF. In addition, we make use of Thomson Reuters cleansing process and remove any 
observations that appear unreasonable or inconsistent. This process is achieved by comparing 
figures reported by insiders on Forms 3, 4, and 5 with external sources. For the purpose of this 
paper, trades with numerous missing or invalid data elements and those that do not meet the 
collection requirements are removed. Figure 1 isolates the insider trading data for firms that 
perform a stock repurchase and plots the net insider sales around the stock repurchase 
announcement dates for both types of repurchase methods.  
Comparing the post-event trading of each type of repurchase to its pre-event trading 
reveals that for both types of repurchases, the number of net sales by insiders following stock 
repurchase announcements tends to increase. The change is more apparent for tender offer 
repurchases. The next two figures focus on insider trading activities following repurchase 
announcements. Figure 2 plots the cumulative insider trading from day 0 to day 62. Figure 3 
presents the distribution of total insider trading activities in the two months following the 
repurchase announcement.  
Figure 2 shows that the net number of shares sold by insiders is larger in firms that 
announce tender offer repurchases than in firms that announce open market repurchases. This is 
surprising given that a large proportion of repurchases use the open market method. As we can 
see in Figure 3, for both types of repurchases, a majority of the announcements in our sample are 
followed by zero to minimal insider trading. Net purchases are less frequent than net sales for 
both types of repurchases with only a small percentage of open market repurchases being 
followed by relatively large net share purchases. This appears to be inconsistent with the 
signaling theory since the stronger signal provided by tender offer repurchases predicts that 
executives should be more likely to purchase shares. However, the difference is likely to be 
insignificant. For both types of repurchases, a large percentage of the announcements are 
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followed by net sales. The difference between the two methods is apparent for net sales of over 
$1,000,000. These figures are 11.5 percent for tender offer repurchases and 5.5 percent for open 
market repurchases. This is consistent with the hypothesis put forward by Fried (2000) that 
suggests that executives who look to offload a large amount of their shares choose tender offers 
over the otherwise more common open market repurchase method. The primary source of 
accounting information are Capital IQ Compustat and SDC. Daily and monthly stock returns are 
obtained from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Table 2 provides the results 
for an event study calculating abnormal returns for a period of 60 days prior to and following the 
stock repurchase announcement. These results are consistent with those reported by Comment 
and Jarrell (1991). 
3. Methodology 
The choice regarding which method of repurchase to use lies with the firm’s executives, 
with many factors influencing their final decision. This section of the paper is divided into two 
main subsections. In subsection 3.1 we employ univariate equality tests and multivariable 
regressions to evaluate the effect of various variables, including actual net insider sales and 
abnormal returns, on the likelihood that a firm uses a given repurchase method. Subsection 3.2 
adds to the previous section by taking into account normal insider trading levels. This is achieved 
by the use of control group test and substituting actual net insider sales with abnormal net insider 
sales within our regression models.  
3.1. Insider sales around repurchase announcements   
The first section of this paper, follows a methodology similar to that of Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006) who investigate the effect of CEO incentives on earnings management. They 
employ five regression models with total accruals as the dependent variable and two definitions 
of insider sales as an independent variable. These variables include total gross insider sales as a 
percentage of firm value and total net sales as a percentage of firm value using data from both 
Thomson Financial and Compustat Execucomp. Their sample includes over 40,000 observations 
and the control variables used include log market capitalization, industry dummies and leverage 
ratios. In this paper, we examine the validity of the two leading hypotheses regarding 
management's choice of tender offers and open-market repurchases. To test these hypotheses we 
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employ a regression analysis with an independent variable related to each hypothesis in addition 
to various control variables. We use a logistic regression model to estimate the effect of signaling 
and management incentives on the probability of choosing a tender offer over an open market 
repurchase. The independent variables in the regression are defined in Table 3. 
The first set of factors emphasized in our regression model is linked to the signaling 
effect or the undervaluation perceived by management. Contrary to Comment and Jarrell (1991) 
who focus on short-term performance effects, we examine the long-term performance of firms in 
terms of stock returns and accounting performance measures. Short term price changes following 
a repurchase are not only affected by the new information regarding management's future 
expectations for the firm but also by price pressures resulting from changes in supply and 
demand. The larger the percentage of shares to be repurchased, the larger the premium paid. 
Moreover, an increased likelihood of repurchase completion will likely influence the stock 
supply and demand equilibrium. The second set of factors used in our regression is related to 
management incentives and more precisely, the direct transfer of value from public shareholders. 
This direct transfer of value occurs when tender offer repurchases are used by management to 
increase the value of their personal portfolios in a short period of time. Therefore, we are 
interested in the trading activities of insiders shortly after the two types of stock repurchase 
programs. The final set of factors consists of our control variables that influence the choice of 
repurchase method. Two examples of such variables are the percentage of shares repurchased by 
the firm and the amount of cash available at the time of repurchase. The amount of cash at the 
time of repurchase may limit the use of tender offer repurchases as this method requires more 
resources. On the other hand, if the firm wants to repurchase a large percentage of shares in a 
short period of time, there are legal implications if they choose to use an open-market 
repurchase. 
We  measure the long-term stock performance of our sample firms by calculating each 
firm's four year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). The BHARs following the 
announcement are measured using standard event study methodology. Using monthly returns 
obtained from CRSP, the expected returns are computed as follows: 
ret = rft + (αi + β1i (rmt - rft)+ β2i SMBt + β3i HMLt)  (1) 
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The Fama-French model parameter estimates, αi and βi, are based on a period of 12 
months ending three months prior to the event date. rit is the return of firm i at time t and rft is the 
risk free return at time t. The cumulative abnormal return is then calculated as 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇 =
 𝛱𝑇 1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡 −  𝛱𝑇(1 + 𝑟𝑒𝑡 ) , where T is the length of the event window. Firms that have 
insufficient stock price data to calculate the parameter estimates for a minimum three month 
period are excluded from the analysis.  
In addition. we proxy for the long-term performance of the firms by considering the 
firm's change in net income in the years following the stock repurchase announcement. More 
precisely, we measure the average change in net income scaled by total assets during the four 
fiscal year ends following the announcement.   
Average change in net income =
 (
𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 −1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 −1
−  
𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 −1
)4𝑡=1
4
               (2) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 −1 and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 −1 represent net income before extraordinary items and 
total assets for the fiscal year ending prior to the repurchase announcement. 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  is 
equal to net income before extraordinary items in the years following the repurchase 
announcement. Three sets of variables are used to capture the effect of management incentives 
regarding the choice of repurchase method. All of these measures pertain to the amount of 
insider trading surrounding the repurchase announcement date. These variables are the same as 
those used by Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and are normalized based on the number of 
shares outstanding or the firm's size. The first two variables are the net dollar amount sold by 
insiders as a percentage of the market capitalization of the firm in the days surrounding the stock 
repurchase announcement, with one variable for the period prior to the announcement and one 
for the period following the announcement. The second two variables focus on the net units sold 
by insiders as a percentage of total common shares outstanding for the firm in the days 
surrounding the stock repurchase announcement, with one variable for the period prior to the 
announcement and one for the period after the announcement. The last variable identifies firms 
with the largest amount of insider trading defined using a dummy variable which equals one if 
insider sales following the announcement for the firm are among the largest among the sample 
firms (top decile). Management incentives are likely to influence some but not all repurchase 
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method decisions. Subsequently, insider trading around the stock repurchase announcement is 
not expected to be a predictive variable for all repurchase method decisions.  The use of this 
dummy variable will allow us to capture effects of management incentives by comparing firms 
with large insider sales following the announcement to firms without large insider sales. The 
variables used to capture the effect of management incentives are measured during periods of 60, 
180 and 390 days surrounding the announcement. We choose to look at a period that goes 
beyond one year prior to and following the event date in order to capture any insider trading 
activities that are purposely planned outside a one year time frame. 
In our estimation, we control for cash and short-term investments, the firm's book to 
market decile, leverage, the size of the firm and the year of repurchase announcement. These 
variables are computed at the fiscal year end prior to the stock repurchase announcement. Cash 
and short-term investments are calculated as a percentage of total assets. The firm's book to 
market decile is based on the yearly book to market percentiles of NYSE-listed firms. We 
measure firm size as the natural logarithm of market capitalization. In addition, two other 
variables, the percentage of total shares outstanding that is announced to be repurchased and a 
dummy variable representing the completion status of the repurchase program are included as 
control variables in the logistic regression model. The firm’s management is expected to have a 
know whether a repurchase will be executed and is thus less likely to choose a tender offer 
repurchase if it is unable or not fully interested in carrying out the repurchase program. In 
addition, if the firm is interested in purchasing a large percentage of shares in a short period of 
time, it might be legally obliged to use a tender offer program due to restrictions on the use of 
open-market repurchases. Lastly, we control for year and industry effects by using a series of 
year and industry dummies based on two digit SIC codes as summarized in Table 4. This 
classification follows Kahle and Walking (1996) who argue against the use of one digit SICs and 
provide ten homogeneous groups using two digit SICs. 
In addition to estimating our logistic regression models, we employ five ordinary least 
squares regression models with net insider sales as the independent variable. These regression 
models test for the effect of different repurchase methods on insider sales following the 
announcement. Specifically, we employ a dummy variable that equals one when the firm 
announces a tender offer, which allows us to evaluate the management incentive theory. Other 
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independent variables used in this regression consist of previous period net insider sales, 
completion status, year of the announcement, and size of the announcement. Seyhun (1986) finds 
that, on average, insiders in small firms are less likely to have net sales compared to insiders in 
large firms. In addition, Jenter (2005) finds that insiders are more likely to sell their holdings at 
higher market valuations. Aboody and Lev (2000) find a significant relationship between 
insiders sales and whether the firm had research and development (R&D) expenses. Specifically, 
firms with R&D expenses have more insider sales. We measure a firm's R&D expenditure as 
R&D expenses divided by sales for the fiscal year ending prior to the announcement. Agrawal 
and Cooper (2014) argue that the greater the potential effect of an event on stock prices, the 
greater is an insider's incentive to trade. We use the firm's cumulative abnormal return over days 
-5 to +5 relative to the announcement to measure this effect. Multiple studies including 
Meulbroek (2000) and Jin (2002) argue and find that high levels of equity risk and increases in 
equity risk encourage managers to sell their stocks. We measure equity risk as the standard 
deviation of stock returns for the period 310 to 186 days before the announcement date. Change 
in equity risk is calculated as the difference between the standard deviation of stock returns for 
the period 185 to 60 days before and the standard deviation of stock returns for the period 310 to 
186 days before the announcement date. 
3.2. Abnormal insider trading around repurchase announcements 
To test the robustness of our results, it is important to account for normal insider trading 
levels. Therefore, we investigate the abnormal insider trading in addition to the actual amount of 
insider trading. There are two main techniques that have been used in the previous literature to 
establish the abnormal level of insider trading. The first technique uses time series data where the 
firm's insider trading behavior during the event period is compared to itself in a prior period (see 
Karpoff and Lee, 1991). Niehaus and Roth (1999) follow this method and use the ratio of the 
number of shares sold by insiders divided by the total number of shares traded by insiders when 
comparing their actual and expected insider trading. As insider trading activity is infrequent and 
non-normal, the use of ratios may help in achieving non skewed abnormal trading results. A 
major disadvantage of using these ratios in our study is that they fail to capture the economic size 
of the repurchase. The second technique employed in the previous literature, uses control firms 
to test the statistical significance of the insider sales. Gosnell et al. (1992) examine abnormal 
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insider trading activity around bankruptcies and identify firms within the same industry that are 
closest in terms of market capitalization to the bankrupt firm and compare their insider trading 
activity during the same periods. To compare our two groups of firms with different stock 
repurchase methods we modify this methodology by selecting our control firms from our sub-
sample of firms with open market repurchases. The control firms, which performed an open 
market repurchase, are linked to those with a tender offer repurchase program on the basis of 
industry and firm size. We use two-digit SIC codes to match on industry. Next we select the firm 
with the smallest difference in market capitalization at the fiscal year end prior to the repurchase 
announcement. Firms from the tender offer sub-sample are removed from our analysis if no 
matching firm in terms of two-digit SIC code or decile of market capitalization are present 
within the open market repurchase sample. In addition, we take into account the number of days 
between stock repurchase announcement dates of the two groups and require that the tender offer 
and open market repurchase announcements occur not more than a given number of days apart. 
Furthermore, we implement another set of logistic regressions which uses abnormal 
insider trading instead of the actual amount of insider trading. In this context, abnormal insider 
trading is calculated using the same methodology used by Gosnell et al. (1992). Under this 
method, the control firms consist of those with no repurchase announcement during our sample 
period. These firms are then grouped according to industry using the one-digit SIC code and size 
using deciles of market capitalization. These control firms are then matched to those with a 
repurchase announcement and  the average insider trading activity for firms within each group is 
calculated for 60, 180, and 390 days prior to and following every repurchase announcement. 
Finally, the abnormal insider activity is calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠it  =    𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠it–  





where net insider salesit measures the net trading by insiders in firm i during month t, net insider 
salesct equals the net trading by insiders in control firm c during month t and n is the number of 
control firms in the same one-digit SIC industry and market capitalization decile as firm i.  
4. Empirical Results 
Similar to the previous section, the results of this paper are presented in two subsections.  
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4.1. Insider sales around repurchase announcements 
To improve our understanding of why management may choose a tender offer repurchase 
over an open-market repurchase we use a logistic regression. The regression results for our 
sample of 1,006 repurchase announcement are presented in Table 5, 6, and 7.  
The three tables differ in terms of the length of the trading window with Table 5 showing 
the net amount of insider sales for a period of 60 days prior to and following repurchase 
announcements. The trading windows for the following two tables are 180 and 390 days. The 
first model presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7 provides the results for a regression with no control 
variables. Models 2 to 5 present the regression results for a different combination of variables 
from each effect discussed previously and shown in Table 3 and include the control variables.  
4.1.1. Management incentive variables 
The results for the 60 and 180 days trading windows show a significantly positive 
estimate for Net sales ($ - Following). The variables representing net sales following the 
announcement have significantly positive parameter estimates. In addition, the dummy variable 
representing the top ten percent of firms in terms of net dollar sold as a percentage of the firm's 
market capitalization is significantly positive. These results indicate that tender offer repurchase 
announcements are more likely to be followed by higher net insider sales as a percentage of the 
firms' total value. Also, the repurchase announcements followed by the highest percentage of net 
sales as a percentage of the firms' total value are more likely to have been a tender offer. These 
results support the management incentive theory. Prior to the announcement, tender offer 
repurchases have a lower amount of net insider sales. However, this is not significant outside of 
the model with no control variables. When we shift to the 390 days trading window, the signs of 
these variables remain constant and are no longer significant. This indicates that the difference 
between the net insider sales is only existent within the first 180 days of the repurchase 
announcement. 
4.1.2. Signaling effect variables 
The regression results for the variables representing the long-term performance of the 
firms are similar for all three tables. The abnormal returns based on four year BHARs are higher 
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for tender offer repurchase announcements.  These results suggest that there is validity behind 
the signaling theory when evaluating the long-term performance of the firms. However, the 
estimate are statistically insignificant in all of the models and trading windows. In unreported 
robustness tests, we also calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for our sample firms 
and employed them another regression model. The results are not provided in this paper as the 
coefficients remain insignificant and are similar to the BHAR methodology. The change in net 
income is negative and also insignificant across all trading windows. Overall, the results 
presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7 are not supportive of the signaling hypothesis as there appears to 
be no significant differences between future performance of firms initiating a tender offer and 
open market repurchase programs. 
4.1.3. Control variables 
The second model is similar to the first model with the addition of control variables: Cash 
and investments available prior to the repurchase announcement, leverage as total liabilities to 
total shareholders' equity, firm's valuation as the book to market ratio, firm size as the log of 
market capitalization, completion status, and size of the repurchase as a percentage of common 
shares standing. In the last four models, we employ combinations of two variables: one that 
represents the long-term performance of the firm and another that captures the amount of insider 
trading. Across all three trading windows program completion and size of the repurchase 
announcement are significantly positive. The book to market decile parameter estimates are 
significantly positive. These results indicate that firms within the larger book to market deciles 
are more likely to initiate a tender offer repurchase. Finally, the log of the firms' market 
capitalization is negative but only statistically significant for the 390 days trading window. These 
results are in line with the summary characteristics of U.S. stock repurchases in Table 1 and our 
expectations summarized in Section 2.  
4.1.4. Multiple trading windows  
In addition to these three tables, Table 8 reports regression results for models that 
separates the trading window into the following six windows: (-390, -181), (-180, -61), (-60, -1), 
(0, 60), (61, 180) and (181, 390). The two trading periods after the repurchase announcement, (0, 
60) and (61, 180), both have a positive coefficient with the (0, 60) window result being 
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significant across all models. The coefficients for the (-61, -1) and (-180,-61) windows are 
negative, indicating that it is more likely that positive net purchases are followed by  tender offer 
repurchase announcements. However, this coefficient is insignificant. These results indicate that 
the significant results observed in Table 8 for the 180 day trading window are likely due to 
strong differences in net sales for the first 60 day portion of the 180 days trading window. As 
expected, the results for the control variables and those capturing the future performance of the 
firm are similar to the results reported in the three previous tables. 
4.1.5. Robustness tests 
To assess whether extreme observations (e.g., firms with large repurchases) are driving 
our results, we divide our sample into two groups based on the size of the repurchase 
announcement. Looking back at the potential objectives behind repurchase announcements (see 
our discussion in section 1), it is likely that the goal for firms with very large repurchases is to 
defend themselves against tender offers. In this case, the logistic regression coefficient will not 
be representative of management incentives and could skew the results for the total sample. 
Panel A of Table 9 provides the results for our sample of firms which announce that they will 
repurchase less than 10% of their common shares outstanding. This subgroup contains 787 firms, 
with 25 tender offer announcements. The results for our insider trading variables remain 
positively significant indicating that our results in the previous regressions are not driven by 
extreme observations as they apply to "common" repurchase announcements. The book to 
market decile remains positive but is no longer significant. This suggests that this variable is 
correlated with the size of the repurchase. The completion status dummy also remains 
significantly positive. 
The second part of the table provides the results for our sample of firms with larger 
repurchase programs, i.e. firms that plan to repurchase more than 10% of their outstanding 
shares. For these large repurchase programs, the amount of insider trading following the event 
date is no longer significant. This result remains consistent with the management incentive 
hypothesis as for very large repurchases, the personal incentives of insiders can no longer play a 
role in the repurchase method decision. When the goal of the repurchase is to discourage a 
takeover, insiders are expected to sell back their stocks for both tender offer and open market 
15 
 
repurchases. Similarly, if a takeover does occur, insiders will be once again selling back their 
stocks for both tender offer and open market repurchases. Interestingly, the net sales prior to the 
repurchase announcement remain negative and is statistically significant for the 390 days trading 
window. Although Fried's (2000) management incentive hypothesis only focuses on insider 
trading following the repurchase announcement, the significantly negative results for insider net 
sales prior to the announcement are also in support of the management incentive hypothesis. The 
book to market decile is again positive but insignificant. The completion status dummy remains 
significantly positive and the log of the firms' market capitalization is negative and statistically 
significant. 
Our next two set of robustness analyses control for effects associated with stock options 
grants. In 2002, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) ruled that companies must 
show the fair value of their stock option given to employees as part of compensation packages on 
their income statements effective the first annual reporting period after June 15, 2005. The value 
can be determined using lattice models, the Black-Scholes-Merton model, Bulow-Shoven model, 
and Monte Carlo simulation models to put a dollar value on their unvested equity awards. This 
ruling resulted in a large number of stock repurchase programs prior to 2005 where firms 
attempted to offset the dramatic dilution effect of their executive stock option exercise. As the 
motive behind these repurchase programs is unique, we evaluate their effect in our results. We 
incorporate into our regression model a dummy variable which equals one if the repurchase 
announcement occurred in or subsequent  to 2005. The results, which are not reported, for net 
insider sales in the 60 days following the announcement date remain positive and significant. 
Additionally, we include in our regression model stock options outstanding prior to the stock 
repurchase announcement as an additional control variable. This variable is used as a proxy for 
the number of options owned by management at the time the repurchase occurs. The regression 
coefficient for this variable is positive but not significant. This supports the management 
incentive theory. The insiders benefit from the resulting increase in the share price, which is why 
insiders with a large number of options are more likely to use a tender offer repurchase. The 




4.1.6. Cross-sectional regression models   
We complete our insider trading analysis by reviewing the results for a regression model 
with net insider sales as the dependent variable. The results for a series of five regression models 
are reported in Table 10. The dependent variables are net sales by insiders during the trading 
window (0, 60) in Model 1, (61, 180) in Models 2 and 3, and (181, 390) in the last two models. 
For all models, net insider sales in the immediately prior periods are significantly positive. For 
Models 4 and 5 where the independent variable is net sales during the (181, 390) window, net 
sales during the (0, 180) window are significantly positive but net sales in the 390 days prior to 
the repurchase announcement are not significant. The dummy variable representing the 
repurchase method is significantly positive in Models 1, 2 and 3 where the trading windows are 
(0, 60) and (61, 180). Consistent with Jenter (2005), firms with larger book to market ratios sell 
significantly less stock. The parameter estimate for the firms' market capitalization is negative. 
This is consistent with Seyhun (1986), however the coefficient is only significant in two models. 
The cumulative abnormal return for the 10 days surrounding the repurchase announcement is 
significantly positive for Model 1.  Our year and industry dummies as well as our other control 
variables are not significant. 
4.2. Abnormal insider trading around repurchase announcements 
The following section consists of the results for a test of the relationship between insider 
trades and method of repurchase and logistic regressions explaining the likelihood of a tender 
offer repurchase over an open market repurchase. 
4.2.1. Relationship between insider trades and method of repurchase 
To account for normal insider trading levels when examining the insider trading within 
repurchasing firms, we employ a modified version of the test employed by Gosnell et al. (1992) 
in Table 11. Specifically, we present results for net insider sales as a percentage of a firms' total 
value for the periods of 60 days prior and following the announcement.  
The mean net insider sales following the announcement date remain consistently higher 
for tender offers than for open market repurchases across all three panels when matching either 
at the 365, 90 or 30 day thresholds. The differences are significant in panel A and B but become 
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insignificant in panel C. In panel C, there is a high probability of a type II error as the number of 
firms used in the analysis is very small. The mean net insider sales prior to the announcement are 
not statistically different and appear to be similar in size except in Panel A. However, when we 
look at the standard deviation, the results are likely to be driven by extreme observations.  
4.2.2. Logistic regression 
Our logistic regression results based on abnormal insider trading are presented in Table 
12. In this table, we calculate abnormal net insider sales as the difference between the 
repurchasing firm's net insider sales and the average net insider sales for a group of firms with 
the same one-digit SIC code and within the same market capitalization decile. The coefficient 
representing abnormal net insider sales remains significantly positive across all three models 
with all other non-control variables statistically insignificant. The control variables for book to 
market decile, the completion status of the repurchase, and the size of the repurchase 
announcement are significantly positive. Table 13 provides regression results for a model in 
which we add insider trading variables for the remaining trading windows within the 390 days 
prior to and following the announcement. Insider sales during the periods (0, 60) and (61, 180) 
after the repurchase announcement both have a positive coefficient and are significant at the 10% 
confidence level across the two models with control variables. For the (-60, -1) and (-180, -61) 
trading windows the coefficient is negative but insignificant.  
5. Summary and Conclusions 
To date, there are only few studies that have examined the reasons and the consequences 
of different types of repurchase methods. Among these, most studies examine the short term 
stock performance of repurchasing firms. The results are generally consistent and indicate a 
larger abnormal stock return for tender offers than for open market repurchases. With the 
assumption that insiders do not tender their own shares, these studies conclude that tender offer 
repurchases send a stronger signal of the firm's management evaluation of the stock price. This 
paper empirically examines the signaling theory concurrently with the hypothesis proposed by 
Fried (2000) who argues that tender offer repurchases are used by insiders to directly or 
indirectly transfer value among shareholders with insiders emerging ahead of the average public 
shareholder. We analyze the long-term stock performance and short-term insider trading 
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activities in a sample of 1,006 publicly traded companies that announced stock repurchase 
programs between January 1, 1995, and December 31, 2007. We employ logistic regressions, 
control group tests, and cross-sectional regressions to compare the two main methods of stock 
repurchase and determine the effects of insider trading and future management expectations for 
the value of the firm on the choice of stock repurchase method. We report statistically larger net 
insider sales following the announcement of tender offer repurchases compared to a control 
group of open market repurchases. In addition, we report statistically larger net insider sales for 
firms performing a tender offer repurchase in our logistic regression analysis. Provided that 
executives have knowledge of their short-term stock trading plans and have an understanding of 
the outcome of the repurchase method on the firm's stock price, our results indicate that 
management incentives may play an important role when managers decide which repurchase 
method they should use. We proxy for the public's misevaluation of the firm relative to the 
management's valuation using the firm's four year abnormal return. This measure shows no 
significant difference between firms choosing open market repurchases and tender offers. This 
finding does not support the signaling hypothesis. As the long-term abnormal returns are difficult 
to accurately estimate, we also examine the firm's net income. The results are similar for the 
change in the firm's net income for the four year following the repurchase.  Furthermore, our 
cross-sectional regression results indicate that the method of repurchase has predictive power 
regarding the amount of insider trading in the 180 days following the repurchase announcement. 
Tender offers produce on average larger net insiders sales of 0.5 to 1 percent of the firm's market 
value. Our results thus provide support for Fried (2000) who proposes management incentives as 
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Table I  
Summary characteristics of U.S. stock repurchases 
This table provides summary statistics for stock repurchases by publicly traded U.S. firms between January 1, 
1996 and December 31, 2007. Panel A provides summary statistics for all stock repurchase announcements. 
Panel B reproduces the summary statistics presented in A by year. Panel C provides summary statistics for our 
sample of 1,006 stock repurchases for which insider trading took place within thirteen months prior to or after 
the announcement. This panel also excludes any repurchase announcements with missing data. Stock 
repurchase announcements is the number of all unique repurchase announcements. Stock repurchase 
programs completed is the percentage of stock repurchases that are completed within each repurchase 
category. The size of repurchase announcement is calculated as the average of the number of shares 
announced to be repurchased divided by the total number of shares outstanding. The book to market ratio, net 
income per share, and market capitalization are computed at the firm's fiscal year end prior to the stock 
repurchase announcement. t value represents the test-statistic of a Satterthwaite t- test of the null hypothesis 
that the means of two populations are equal. Median Z reports the Mood's median two-sample test statistic 
for the null hypothesis that the medians are identical. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
Panel  A: Number of stock repurchase announcements, stock repurchase size and completion rate 









Panel  A: All stock repurchase announcements 
Stock repurchase 
announcements 




88.70% 43.42% -32.22*** N/A N/A N/A 
Size of 
repurchase 
announcement   
19.15% 6.91% -15.35*** 13.5% 5.01% 17.09*** 




Size of repurchase 
announcement   
Stock repurchase programs 
completed 
 Fixed Price Open-Market Fixed Price Open-Market Fixed Price Open-Market 
1996 47 727 19.47% 6.86% 95.74% 61.62% 
1997 61 684 16.06% 6.63% 93.44% 53.07% 
1998 48 1047 21.61% 7.16% 93.75% 47.09% 
1999 54 798 23.26% 7.17% 96.30% 46.49% 
2000 60 619 32.70% 7.04% 93.33% 39.74% 
2001 52 339 17.46% 6.53% 88.46% 38.64% 
2002 39 433 27.85% 6.88% 66.67% 28.64% 
2003 59 274 20.52% 6.73% 83.05% 33.94% 
2004 42 366 11.40% 5.94% 88.10% 34.70% 
2005 51 439 16.43% 6.71% 98.04% 41.46% 
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2006 64 385 12.57% 6.97% 92.19% 37.66% 
2007 51 434 11.20% 7.61% 68.63% 27.42% 
Panel  C: Stock repurchase announcements with insider trading within thirteen months prior to or following the 
announcement 
 Fixed Price 
Open-
Market 










88.61% 39.67% -12.47*** N/A N/A N/A 
Size of 
repurchase 
announcement   
18.95% 6.76% -3.80*** 13.33% 5.32% 8.30*** 
Book to market 
ratio 
0.53 0.45 -2.42*** 0.51 0.42 1.75* 
Net income on 
assets 
0.05 0.06 0.88 0.04 0.05 -2.14** 
Market 
capitalization  
$ 6,840 m $ 9,742 m 0.88 $ 623 m $ 1,236 m -1.75* 
Leverage  2.93 6.07 1.99** 1.95 2.33 -3.34*** 




Abnormal return statistics for multiple event windows 
This table reports the abnormal returns for multiple event windows surrounding the stock repurchase 
announcement. The mean cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using equally weighted market 
adjusted returns with an estimation period of 365 trading days ending 365 days before the stock repurchase 
announcement. A Patell Z test is performed to test the hypothesis that the mean cumulative abnormal return 
is statistically different from 0. In addition, we perform a Generalized Sign Z test to test for the significance of 
the difference between positive and negative returns during the even window. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 




Abnormal Return Patell Z Positive/Negative Generalized Sign Z 
(-60,-1) 1.71% 0.881 45:32 2.041* 
(-30,-1) 0.78% 0.631 44:33 1.812* 
(-10,-1) 0.46% 0.755 40:37 0.899 
(-5,-1) 0.57% 1.108 44:33 1.812* 
(-2,-1) 0.47% 1.574$ 37:40 0.214 
(-1,0) 4.61% 14.772*** 59:18 5.238*** 
(-1,+1) 6.42% 17.148*** 69:8 7.522*** 
(0,+1) 6.26% 20.386*** 72:5 8.207*** 
(0,+2) 6.01% 15.907*** 69:8 7.522*** 
(0,+5) 6.05% 11.269*** 64:13 6.380*** 
(0,+30) 5.28% 4.152*** 58:19 5.010*** 
(0,+60) 5.03% 2.210* 45:32 2.041* 




Abnormal Return Patell Z Positive/Negative Generalized Sign Z 
(-60,-1) -5.01% -9.404*** 338:605 -7.353*** 
(-30,-1) -3.03% -7.691*** 366:577 -5.528*** 
(-10,-1) -1.11% -4.844*** 417:526 -2.203* 
(-5,-1) -0.31% -1.601$ 461:482 0.666 
(-2,-1) -0.01% 0.614 477:466 1.709* 
(-1,0) 0.52% 6.091*** 535:408 5.490*** 
(-1,+1) 1.13% 10.880*** 584:359 8.684*** 
(0,+1) 1.12% 13.025*** 602:341 9.858*** 
(0,+2) 1.14% 11.069*** 589:354 9.010*** 
(0,+5) 1.21% 8.727*** 585:358 8.750*** 
(0,+30) 1.29% 3.813*** 522:421 4.642*** 







This table provides an overview of the variables used in our logistic regression, the effect that the variable aims to capture, and the definition of the variable.  
Effect Variable Definition 
Signaling 
Hypothesis 
Long-term stock returns Four year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) following the announcement 
Long-term earnings Average improvement in net income as a percentage of total assets for the four fiscal year ends 
following the repurchase announcement  
Management 
Incentives 
Net  sales (dollars) Net dollar amount sold by insiders in the months surrounding the stock repurchase announcement 
Net  sales (units) Net units sold by insiders in the months surrounding the stock repurchase announcement 
Largest sales Dummy variable, equal to one if insider sales for the firm are among the largest among our sample firms 
(top decile) 
Control Variables Cash on assets Cash and short-term investments as a percentage of total assets of the firm at the fiscal year end prior 
to the stock repurchase announcement  
Leverage Total debt to shareholder's equity  at the fiscal year end prior to the stock repurchase announcement 
Book to market ratio  Book to market ratio of the firm at the fiscal year  end  prior to the stock repurchase announcement 
Size of firm Log of the market capitalization of the firm at the fiscal year  end  prior to the stock repurchase 
announcement 
Completed Dummy variable, equal to one if the stock repurchase is completed partially or with the full number of 
shares announced  
Size of repurchase Percentage of total shares outstanding announced to be repurchased 
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 Table 4 
Industry classification 
This table provides the industry breakdown of our sample firms 
based on two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes. 
(see Kahle and Walking 1996) 
Group Description Two Digit 
Major Code 
A Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 01-09 
B Mining 10-14 
C Construction 15-17 
D Manufacturing 20-39 
E Transportation, Communication, 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 
40-49 
F Wholesale Trade 50-51 
G Retail Trade 52-59 
H Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 60-67 
I Services 70-89 




Logistic regression of tender offer repurchase likelihood (390 days insider trading window) 
This table presents the results of six logistic regressions that explain the likelihood of a tender offer repurchase over an open market repurchase 
announcement. The dependent variable is a binomial variable that equals one if the firm announced a tender offer repurchase and zero if the firm 
announced an open market repurchase. Net sales ($ - Prior) is the net amount of insider sales as a percentage of the market capitalization of the 
firm in the 390 days prior to the announcement. Net sales ($ - Following) is the net amount of insider trading as a percentage of the market 
capitalization of the firm in the 390 days following the announcement. Net sales (Units - Prior) is the net number of units sold by insiders as a 
percentage of the total number of common shares outstanding of the firm in the 390 days prior to the announcement. Net sales (Units - Following) 
is the net number of units sold by insider as a percentage of the total number of common shares outstanding of the firm in the 390 days following 
the announcement. Largest sales is a dummy variable equal to one if insider unit sales for the firm following the repurchase announcement are 
among the largest among the sample firms (top decile). The four year abnormal return is calculated as the four year BHAR using the Fama-French 
three factor model. Change in net income is calculated as the average change in income as a percentage of total assets for the four fiscal year ends 
following the announcement. Cash and  investments, book to market ratios and the size of the firm are computed at the fiscal year end prior to the 
stock repurchase announcement. The size of repurchase measures the proportion of shares to be repurchased relative to total shares outstanding. 
Completed is a dummy variable that equals to one if the stock repurchase is completed partially or with the full number of shares announced. P-
values are listed in parentheses below the regression coefficients. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 
and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Logistic regression of tender offer repurchase likelihood (180 days insider trading window) 
This table presents the results of six logistic regressions that explain the likelihood of a tender offer repurchase over an open market repurchase 
announcement. The dependent variable is a binomial variable that equals one if the firm announced a tender offer repurchase and zero if the firm 
announced an open market repurchase. Net sales ($ - Prior) is the net amount of insider sales as a percentage of the market capitalization of the 
firm in the 180 days prior to the announcement. Net sales ($ - Following) is the net amount of net insider sales as a percentage of the market 
capitalization of the firm in the 180 days following the announcement. Net sales (Units - Prior) is the net number of units sold by insiders as a 
percentage of the total number of common shares outstanding of the firm in the 180 days prior to the announcement. Net sales (Units - Following) 
is the net number of units sold by insider as a percentage of the total number of common shares outstanding of the firm in the 180 days following 
the announcement. Largest sales is a dummy variable equal to one if insider unit sales for the firm following the repurchase announcement are 
among the largest among the sample firms (top decile). The four year abnormal return is calculated as the four year BHAR using the Fama-French 
three factor model. Change in net income is calculated as the average change in income as a percentage of total assets for the four fiscal year ends 
following the announcement. Cash and  investments, book to market ratios and the size of the firm are computed at the fiscal year end prior to the 
stock repurchase announcement. The size of repurchase measures the proportion of shares to be repurchased relative to total shares outstanding. 
Completed is a dummy variable that equals to one if the stock repurchase is completed partially or with the full number of shares announced. P-
values are listed in parentheses below the regression coefficients. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 
and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 




Model 4  Model 5 
 




















Net sales ($ - Prior) -0.2593** 
 
-0.0650 











Net sales ($ - Following) 0.2255*** 
 
0.1266** 











Net sales (Units - Prior) 
    
-0.0193 
   
 
 
    
(0.7940) 
   
 
Net sales (Units - Following) 
    
0.1525** 
   
 
 
    
(0.0164) 
   
 
Largest sales  
        
0.8992 
 
        
(0.0268)** 
















Change in net income 





















































































































































































        
 


























Logistic regression of tender offer repurchase likelihood (60 days insider trading window) 
This table presents the results of six logistic regressions that explain the likelihood of a tender offer repurchase over an open market repurchase 
announcement. The dependent variable is a binomial variable that equals one if the firm announced a tender offer repurchase and zero if the firm 
announced an open market repurchase. Net sales ($ - Prior) is the net amount of insider sales as a percentage of the market capitalization of the 
firm in the 60 days prior to the announcement. Net sales ($ - Following) is the net amount of insider trading as a percentage of the market 
capitalization of the firm in the 60 days following the announcement. Net sales (Units - Prior) is the net number of units sold by insiders as a 
percentage of the total number of common shares outstanding of the firm in the 60 days prior to the announcement. Net sales (Units - Following) is 
the net number of units sold by insider as a percentage of the total number of common shares outstanding of the firm in the 60 days following the 
announcement. Largest sales is a dummy variable equal to one if insider unit sales for the firm following the repurchase announcement are among 
the largest among the sample firms (top decile). The four year abnormal return is calculated as the four year BHAR using the Fama-French three 
factor model. Change in net income is calculated as the average change in income as a percentage of total assets for the four fiscal year ends 
following the announcement. Cash and  investments, book to market ratios and the size of the firm are computed at the fiscal year end prior to the 
stock repurchase announcement. The size of repurchase measures the proportion of shares to be repurchased relative to total shares outstanding. 
Completed is a dummy variable that equals to one if the stock repurchase is completed partially or with the full number of shares announced. P-
values are listed in parentheses below the regression coefficients. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 
and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 




Model 4  Model 5 
 
        
 
















Net sales ($ - Prior) -0.2453*** 
 
-0.2059 
   








Net sales ($ - Following) 0.2934*** 
 
0.1667* 







   
(0.0546)   
Net sales (Units - Prior)  
   
0.0160 
 
   
  
   
(0.8543) 
 
   
Net sales (Units - Following) 
    
0.1915** 
   
 
 
    
(0.0354) 
   
 
Largest sales  
        
1.0554*** 
 
        
(0.0077) 












Change in net income 









Cash on assets   -0.5088 
 





(0.6851)  (0.5436)  (0.5308) 
Leverage   -0.0366 
 
0.0414  -0.0423  -0.0456 
   (0.4517) 
 
(0.3704)  (0.4045)  (0.3485) 
Book to market decile    0.1173* 
 
0.1240*  0.1168*  0.1339** 




































































































Wald Chi-Square 19.4554***  101.8573***  102.3926***  102.3826***  101.3059*** 
 (0.0002)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
          
Max-rescaled R-Square 0.0520  0.4348  0.4351  0.4300  0.4396 
R-Square 0.0216  0.1791  0.1792  0.1771  0.1811 
          
          





Logistic regression of tender offer repurchase likelihood (multiple insider trading windows) 
This table presents the results of three logistic regressions that explain the likelihood of a tender offer 
repurchase over an open market repurchase announcement. The dependent variable is a binomial variable 
that equals one if the firm announced a tender offer repurchase and zero if the firm announced an open 
market repurchase. Net sales (period) is the net amount of insider sales as a percentage of the market 
capitalization of the firm in the days surrounding the announcement. The four year abnormal return is 
calculated as the four year BHAR using the Fama-French three factor model. Change in net income is 
calculated as the average change in income as a percentage of total assets for the four fiscal year ends 
following the announcement.  Cash and  investments, book to market ratio and the size of the firm are 
computed at the fiscal year end prior to the stock repurchase announcement. The size of repurchase 
measures the proportion of shares to be repurchased relative to total shares outstanding. Completed is a 
dummy variable that equals to one if the stock repurchase is completed partially or with the full number of 
shares announced. P-values are listed in parentheses below the regression coefficients. * indicates 
significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level. 




     









































































Change in net income 
    
-0.0654 
 
    
(0.2970) 


















Book to market decile    0.1221* 
 
0.1212* 
   (0.0776) 
 
(0.0748) 

























































Wald Chi-Square 24.0298***  106.0307***  106.6490*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
      
Max-rescaled R-Square 0.0625  0.4480  0.4440 
R-Square 0.0259  0.1858  0.1841 




Logistic regression of tender offer repurchase likelihood  
(by stock repurchase size) 
This table presents the results of a series of logistic regressions that explain the likelihood of a tender offer repurchase over an open market 
repurchase announcement for two subgroups of stock repurchases based on the size of the repurchase program. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm announced a tender offer repurchase and zero if the firm announced an open market repurchase. 
Net sales ($ - Prior) is the net amount of insider trading as a percentage of the market capitalization of the firm in the days prior to the 
announcement. Net sales ($ - Following) is the net amount of insider trading as a percentage of the market capitalization of the firm in the 
days following the announcement. Four year abnormal return is calculated as the four year BHAR using the Fama-French three factor model. 
Change in net income is calculated as the average change in income as a percentage of total assets for the four fiscal year ends following the 
announcement. Cash and  investments, book to market ratio and the size of the firm are computed at the fiscal year end prior to the stock 
repurchase announcement. The size of repurchase measures the proportion of shares to be repurchased relative to total shares outstanding. 
Completed is a dummy variable that equals to one if the stock repurchase is completed partially or with the full number of shares 
announced. P-values are listed in parentheses below the regression coefficients. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 












































































































































































        




Regression of insider sales 
This table provides coefficient estimates for a series of ordinary least squares regressions in which we regress net insider sales during 
different trading windows on a series of explanatory variables. The explanatory variables include net insider sales in the period prior to 
the trading window, the cumulative abnormal return during a period of days -5 to +5 days around the announcement, a tender offer 
dummy variable that equals one if the repurchase method is fixed price or Dutch auction. The book to market ratio and the size of the 
firm are computed at the fiscal year end prior to the stock repurchase announcement. The size of the repurchase measures the 
proportion of shares to be repurchased relative to total shares outstanding. Completed is a dummy variable that equals to one if the stock 
repurchase is completed partially or with the full number of shares announced. R&D to sales is calculated as R&D expenses divided by 
sales for the fiscal year ending prior to the announcement. Standard deviation is calculated as the standard deviation of stock returns for 
the period from 310 to 186 days before the announcement date. Change in standard deviation is calculated as the difference between 
the standard deviation of stock returns for the period from 185 to 60 days before and the period from 310 to 186 days before the 
announcement date. P-values are listed in parentheses below the regression coefficients. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 























































Net sales (0, 60) 
    
0.21343*** 
   
 
 
    
(<.0001) 
   
 
Net sales (0, 180) 
        
0.25099*** 
 
        
(<.0001) 





































































































































































































Tests of the relationship between net insiders sales and stock repurchase method  
This table provides the results for a test of the relationship between insider trades and method of 
repurchase. Means represent the net amount of insider sales as a percentage of the market capitalization of 
the firm in the 60 days prior to or following the announcement. The control group consists of firms with an 
open market repurchase. Firms are linked on the basis of industry and firm size. Two-digit SIC codes are used to 
match by industry. The log market capitalization of each firm is calculated at the first fiscal year end prior to the 
repurchase announcement and is used as a proxy for size. Firms from the tender offer sample are removed 
from the analysis if we are unable to find a matching firm in terms of two-digit SIC code or decile of market 
capitalization in the open market repurchase sample group. When multiple control firms exist within the same 
two-digit SIC code and size decile, we select the control firm with the smallest size difference. Panel B and C 
add more stringent restrictions based on the difference between the tender offer and the corresponding open 
market repurchase announcement. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Tender Offer Sample 
(51 firms) 
 





Panel A: Stock repurchase announcements =<365 days apart  
Mean - (Net Sales - $ - Following) 0.59  0.13 
 
0.0870* 














     
Panel B: Stock repurchase announcements =<90 days apart 
 Tender Offer Sample 
 (34 firms) 
 























Panel C: Stock repurchase announcements =<30 days apart 
 Tender Offer Sample 
 (19 firms) 
 


























Logistic regression of tender offer repurchase likelihood (Abnormal insider trading - 60 days window) 
This table presents the results of three logistic regressions that explain the likelihood of a tender offer repurchase 
over an open market repurchase announcement using abnormal insider trading volumes. The dependent variable 
is a binomial variable that equals one if the firm announced a tender offer repurchase and zero if the firm 
announced an open market repurchase. Net sales ($ - Prior) is the net amount of abnormal insider sales as a 
percentage of the market capitalization of the firm in the 60 days prior to the announcement. Net sales ($ - 
Following) is the net amount of abnormal insider trading as a percentage of the market capitalization of the firm in 
the 60 days following the announcement. The four year abnormal return is calculated as the four year BHAR using 
the Fama-French three factor model. Change in net income is calculated as the average change in income as a 
percentage of total assets for the four fiscal year ends following the announcement. Cash and  investments, book 
to market ratios and the size of the firm are computed at the fiscal year end prior to the stock repurchase 
announcement. The size of repurchase measures the proportion of shares to be repurchased relative to total 
shares outstanding. Completed is a dummy variable that equals to one if the stock repurchase is completed 
partially or with the full number of shares announced. P-values are in parenthesis under the regression estimate 
coefficients. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 




     

































Change in net income 
    
-0.0632 
 
    
(0.3082) 


















Book to market decile    0.1205* 
 
0.1196* 
   (0.0700) 
 
(0.0698) 















































Score Chi-Square 29.1742***  210.5220***  211.4908*** 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Wald Chi-Square 17.9403***  101.1337***  101.8640*** 
 (0.0005)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Max-rescaled R-Square 0.0469  0.4350  0.4300 





Logistic regression of tender offer repurchase likelihood (Abnormal insider trading - multiple 
insider trading windows) 
This table presents the results of three logistic regressions that explain the likelihood of a tender offer 
repurchase over an open market repurchase announcement using abnormal insider trading volumes. The 
dependent variable is a binomial variable that equals one if the firm announced a tender offer repurchase and 
zero if the firm announced an open market repurchase. sales (period) is the net amount of abnormal insider 
sales as a percentage of the market capitalization of the firm in the days surrounding the announcement. The 
four year abnormal return is calculated as the four year BHAR using the Fama-French three factor model. 
Change in net income is calculated as the average change in income as a percentage of total assets for the 
four fiscal year ends following the announcement. Cash and  investments, book to market ratios and the size 
of the firm are computed at the fiscal year end prior to the stock repurchase announcement. The size of 
repurchase measures the proportion of shares to be repurchased relative to total shares outstanding. 
Completed is a dummy variable that equals to one if the stock repurchase is completed partially or with the 
full number of shares announced. P-values are in parenthesis under the regression estimate coefficients. * 
indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance 
at the 1% level. 




     









































































Change in net income 
    
-0.0720 
 
    
(0.2582) 








Leverage   -0.0591 
 
-0.0665 
   (0.2407) 
 
(0.1993) 
Book to market decile    0.1168* 
 
0.1164* 
   (0.0986) 
 
(0.0938 
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Figure 1: Insider trading activity around stock repurchase program announcements 
 Figure 1.a isolates the insider trading data for firms that perform a stock repurchase and plots the net insider sales for the eight weeks prior and following the 
stock repurchase announcement date for both types of repurchase methods. The net dollar amount sold by insiders is calculated as the sum of insider sales for 












































Figure 1.b isolates the insider trading data for firms that perform a stock repurchase and plots the net insider sales for the eight weeks prior and following the 
stock repurchase announcement date for both types of repurchase methods. The net number of units sold by insiders is calculated as the sum of insider sales 
















































Figure 2: Cumulative insider trading from day 0 to day 61 














































Figure 3. Distribution of insider trading per repurchase 
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